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Abstract—In this paper, a new pseudo-random number gen-
erator (PRNG) based on chaotic iterations is proposed. This
method also combines the digits of two XORshifts PRNGs. The
statistical properties of this new generator are improved: the
generated sequences can pass all the DieHARD statistical test
suite. In addition, this generator behaves chaotically, as defined
by Devaney. This makes our generator suitable for cryptographic
applications. An illustration in the field of data hiding is presented
and the robustness of the obtained data hiding algorithm against
attacks is evaluated.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) is an algorithm
for generating a sequence of numbers that is supposed to be in-
distinguishable from a uniformly chosen random sequence [7].
The sequence is not truly random in that it is completely
determined by a relatively small set of initial values, called the
PRNG’s seed. Compare to hardware-based approaches, these
PRNGs must be easy to generate and process, but are less
closer to truly random behavior. PRNGs play an important
role in practice for a whole range of applications such as infor-
mation security, statistics (samplings, simulations and Monte-
Carlo techniques), video games and gambling machines, to
name a few [4]. These PRNGs are often based on logical
operations like bitwise exclusive or (XOR) and on circular shift
of bit vectors. XORshift, designed by George Marsaglia [9], is
a popular example of such generators. However, the security
level of some PRNGs of this kind has been revealed to be
inadequate by today’s standards. We investigated whether it
would be possible to combine two generators in some way that
would give better properties than the individual components
alone.
This paper extends the study started in [2] and [15]. In [2], it
is proven that chaotic iterations (CIs), a suitable tool for fast
computing iterative algorithms, satisfies the chaos property, as
it is defined by Devaney [3]. In [15], the chaotic behavior
of CIs are exploited in order to obtain an unpredictable
PRNG. This generator, based on chaotic iterations, depends
on two input sequences. In [15], these two sequences are
constituted by two logistic maps. This novel generator has
successfully passed the NIST (National Institute of Standards
and Technology of the U.S. Government) battery of tests [10].
In this new paper, we achieve to improve the speed of the
former PRNG, by using two XORshifts in place of the logistic
map. In addition, this new version of our PRNG is able to
pass the famous DieHARD statistical battery of tests [8].
And its security is improved compared to XORshift alone,
and to our former PRNG. After presenting the theoretical
framework of the study, a concrete example of how to use these
pseudo-random numbers in the field of data hiding is detailed.
An analysis focuses on the watermarked images which have
already been subjected to common image distortion attacks. It
is shown that sequences generated from this generator have a
good robustness in the presence of such attacks.
The rest of this paper is organized in the following way: in
Section II, some basic definitions concerning chaotic iterations
and PRNGs are recalled. Then, the generator based on discrete
chaotic iterations is presented in Section III. In Section IV,
we show that the proposed PRNG passes the DieHARD
statistical tests. In Sections V and VI, there is a discussion
on a potential application scenario to watermarking. Finally,
some conclusions and future work are drawn in Section VII.
II. BASIC RECALLS
This section is devoted to basic notations and terminologies
in the fields of chaotic iterations and PRNGs.
A. Notations
~1; N → {1, 2, . . . , N}
sn → the nth term of a sequence s = (s1, s2, . . .)
vi → the ith component of an array v = (v1, v2, . . .)
f k → kth composition of a function f
f k = f ◦ ... ◦ f︸     ︷︷     ︸
k times
strategy → a sequence which elements belong in ~1; N
S → the set of all strategies
⊕ → bitwise exclusive or
+ → the integer addition
≪ and ≫→ the usual shift operators
B. Chaotic iterations
Definition 1 The set B denoting {0, 1}, let f : BN −→ BN be
an “iteration” function and S ∈ S be a chaotic strategy. Then,
the so-called chaotic iterations are defined by
x0 ∈ BN,
∀n ∈ N∗,∀i ∈ ~1; N, xni =
{
xn−1i if S
n , i
f (xn−1)S n if S n = i.
(1)
In other words, at the nth iteration, only the S n−th cell is
“iterated”. Note that in a more general formulation, S n can
be a subset of components and f (xn−1)S n can be replaced by
f (xk)S n (where k < n), thus describing for example, delays
due to transmissions (see e.g. [1]). For the general definition
of such chaotic iterations, see, e.g. [11].
Chaotic iterations generate a set of vectors (boolean vector in
this paper), they are defined by an initial state x0, an iteration
function f and a chaotic strategy S .
C. XORshift
XORshift is a category of very fast PRNGs designed by
George Marsaglia [9]. It repeatedly uses the exclusive or
(XOR) on a number, with a bit shifted copy of itself by a
positions either to the right or to the left, where 0 < a < w
and w = 32 or 64. The initial state of a XORshift generator is a
given vector of bits. At each step, the next state is obtained by
applying a given number of XORshift operations as defined in
Algorithm 1. This algorithm has a period of 232−1 = 4.29×109.
Input: x (a 32-bit word)
Output: r (a 32-bit word)
x ← x ⊕ (x ≪ 13);
x ← x ⊕ (x ≫ 17);
x ← x ⊕ (x ≪ 5);
r ← x;
return r;
Algorithm 1: An arbitrary round of XORshift
D. Input sequences
In [15], we have used two logistic maps [14] as input
sequences to define a novel PRNG (called CI PRNG) based
on chaotic iterations. We have mathematically proven that it
behaves chaotically, as defined by Devaney. In addition, this
generator can successfully pass the NIST tests suite. However,
chaotic systems like logistic maps work in the real numbers
domain, and therefore a transformation from real numbers into
integers is needed. This process leads to a degradation of the
chaotic behavior of the generator and a lot of time wasted
during computations [5]. Our purpose is then to improve the
speed of this former generator and grant its chaotic properties
by using a faster PRNG, namely XORshift. Moreover, we will
show in Section IV-B that this new generator can pass the
famous DieHARD battery of tests.
III. THE GENERATION OF CI PSEUDO-RANDOM SEQUENCE
The design of the PRNG based on discrete chaotic iterations
is proposed in this section, while its performance is evaluated
in the next one.
A. Chaotic iterations as PRNG
The novel generator is designed by the following pro-
cess. Let N ∈ N∗,N > 2. Some chaotic iterations
are done, which generate a sequence (xn)n∈N ∈
(
B
N
)N
of boolean vectors: the successive states of the iterated
system. Some of those vectors are chaotically extracted
and their components constitute our pseudo-random bit
flow. Chaotic iterations are realized as follows: initial state
x0 ∈ BN is a boolean vector taken as a seed and chaotic strategy
(S n)n∈N ∈ ~1,NN is constructed with XORshift. Lastly, iterate
function f is the vectorial boolean negation
f0 : (x1, ..., xN) ∈ BN 7−→ (x1, ..., xN) ∈ BN.
To sum up, at each iteration, only S i-th component of state xn
is updated as follows
xni =

xn−1i if i , S
i,
xn−1i if i = S
i.
(2)
Finally, let M be a finite subset of N∗. Some xn are selected
by a sequence mn as the pseudo-random bit sequence of our
generator. The sequence (mn)n∈N ∈ MN is computed with
XORshift. So, the generator returns the following values:
• the components of xm0 ,
• following by the components of xm0+m1 ,
• following by the components of xm0+m1+m2 ,
• etc.
In other words, the generator returns the following bits:
x
m0
1 x
m0
2 x
m0
3 . . . x
m0
N x
m0+m1
1 x
m0+m1
2 . . . x
m0+m1
N x
m0+m1+m2
1 x
m0+m1+m2
2 . . .
and its kth bit is equal to
x
∑⌊k/N⌋
i=0 mi
k+1 (mod N).
The basic design procedure of the novel generator is summed
up in Algorithm 2. The internal state is x, the output array is r;
a and b are those computed by the two XORshift generators.
Lastly, c and N are constants and M = {c,c+1} (c > 3N is
recommended).
Input: the internal state x
(x is an array of N 1-bit words)
Output: an array r of N 1-bit words
a ← XORshi f t1();
m ← a mod 2 + c;
for i = 0, . . . ,m do
b ← XORshi f t2();
S ← b mod N;
xS ← xS ;
end
r ← x;
return r;
Algorithm 2: An arbitrary round of CI generator
B. Example
In this example, N = 5 and M = {4,5} are adopted
for easy understanding. The initial state of the system x0
can be seeded by the decimal part of the current time. For
example, the current time in seconds since the Epoch is
1237632934.484084, so t = 484084. x0 = t (mod 32) in binary
digits, then x0 = (1, 0, 1, 0, 0). m and S can now be computed
from two XORshift PRNGs:
m = 4, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 5, 4,...
S = 2, 4, 2, 2, 5, 1, 1, 5, 5, 3, 2, 3, 3,...
Chaotic iterations are made with initial state x0, vectorial
logical negation f0 and strategy S . The result is presented in
Table I. Let us recall that sequence m gives the states xn to
return: x4, x4+5, x4+5+4, . . .
So, in this example, the output of the generator is:
10100111101111110011...
TABLE I
APPLICATION EXAMPLE
m : 4 5 4
S 2 4 2 2 5 1 1 5 5 3 2 3 3
x0 x4 x9 x13
1 1 1−→ 0 1−→ 1 1 1
0 2−→ 1 2−→ 0 2−→ 1 1 1 2−→ 0 0
1 1 1
3
−→ 0 3−→ 1 3−→ 0 0
0 4−→ 1 1 1 1
0 0 5−→ 1 5−→ 0 5−→ 1 1 1
Output: x01 x
0
2 x
0
3 x
0
4 x
0
5 x
4
1 x
4
2 x
4
3 x
4
4 x
4
5 x
9
1 x
9
2 x
9
3 x
9
4 x
9
5 x
13
1 x
13
2 x
13
3 x
13
4 x
13
5 ... = 10100111101111110011...
C. Chaotic properties
Despite a large number of papers published in the field of
chaos-based PRNGs, the impact that this research has made
on conventional information security is rather marginal. This is
due to the following reasons: almost all chaotic algorithms are
based on dynamical systems defined on the set of real numbers.
So these generators are usually slow, require considerably
more storage space and lose some of their chaotic properties
during computations. These major problems restrict their use
in security fields as cryptography [6].
The PRNG proposed in this paper does not inherit its chaotic
properties from a real chaotic map, but from chaotic iterations
defined in Section II-B. It has been proven in [2] that CIs
behave as chaos, as it is defined by Devaney: they are regular,
transitive and sensitive to initial conditions. This most famous
definition of chaotic behavior for a dynamical system implies
various desired properties in information security, such as:
unpredictability, mixture, sensitivity, and uniform repartition.
The principal interest of CIs is that they can be used without
real numbers. Indeed, the sequence inputed in chaotic iterations
constitutes a coordinate of its initial state, and the chaotic
behavior of a dynamical system does not depend on this initial
state. So if we take integer sequences as input instead, then CIs
become faster while preserving their chaotic properties. This
allows the conception of a new generation of fast and chaotic
PRNGs
IV. TESTING A GENERATOR
Here, the empirical tests have been carried out, making use
of the DieHARD statistical test suite. In this section we will
briefly review the approach taken together with key results and
conclusions. It is not our intention to document these tests in
detail in the present section, since it has been done several
times in many other papers [8],[12],[13].
A. DieHARD battery of tests
DieHARD battery of tests has been a stringent standard
for evaluating PRNGs for over a decade. Passing this battery
is considered as a good rule of thumb to validate a PRNG.
DieHARD battery consists of 18 different independent sta-
tistical tests. This collection of tests is based on assessing
the randomness of bits comprising 32-bit integers obtained
from a random number generator. Each test requires 223 32-bit
integers in order to run the full set of tests.
Most of the tests in DieHARD return a p−value, which should
be uniform on [0, 1) if the input file contains truly independent
random bits. Those p−values are obtained by p = F(X), where
F is the assumed distribution of the sample random variable
X–often supposed as normal distribution. But that assumed F
is just an asymptotic approximation, for which the fit will be
worst in the tails. Thus occasional p−values near 0 or 1, such
as 0.0012 or 0.9983, are not surprising. An individual test is
considered to be a failure if its p−value approaches 1 more
closely, for example p > 0.9999.
B. Analysis
Table II gives the results derived from applying the
DieHARD battery of tests to the RNGs considered in this
work. As it can be observed, the results of the individual
tests Count the ones 1, Binary Rank 31 × 31 and Binary
Rank 32 × 32 show that in the random numbers obtained
with the XORshift generator only the least significant bits
seem to be independent. This explains the poor behavior of
this RNG in the aforementioned basic tests that evaluate the
independence of real numbers. But the generator based on
discrete chaotic iterations can pass all the DieHARD battery
of tests. This proves that the security of the given generator
has been improved by CIs.
V. APPLICATION EXAMPLE IN DIGITAL WATERMARKING
Information hiding has recently become a major information
security technology, especially with the increasing impor-
tance and widespread distribution of digital media through
the Internet [16]. It includes several techniques like digital
watermarking. The aim of digital watermarking is to embed a
piece of information into digital documents, such as pictures
or movies. This is for a large panel of reasons, such as: copy-
right protection, control utilization, data description, content
authentication, and data integrity. For these reasons, many
different watermarking schemes have been proposed in recent
years. Digital watermarking must have essential characteristics,
including: security, imperceptibility, and robustness. Chaotic
methods have been proposed to encrypt the watermark before
embedding it in the carrier image for these security reasons. In
this paper, a new watermarking algorithm is given. It is based
on the chaotic PRNG presented above.
A. Most and least significant coefficients
Let us first introduce the definitions of most and least
significant coefficients.
TABLE II
RESULTS OF DIEHARD BATTERY OF TESTS
No. Test name Generators
XORshift PRNG (Chaotic iterations)
1 Overlapping Sum Pass Pass
2 Runs Up 1 Pass Pass
Runs Down 1 Pass Pass
Runs Up 2 Pass Pass
Runs Down 2 Pass Pass
3 3D Spheres Pass Pass
4 Parking Lot Pass Pass
5 Birthday Spacing Pass Pass
6 Count the ones 1 Fail Pass
7 Binary Rank 6 × 8 Pass Pass
8 Binary Rank 31 × 31 Fail Pass
9 Binary Rank 32 × 32 Fail Pass
10 Count the ones 2 Pass Pass
11 Bit Stream Pass Pass
12 Craps Wins Pass Pass
Throws Pass Pass
13 Minimum Distance Pass Pass
14 Overlapping Perm. Pass Pass
15 Squeeze Pass Pass
16 OPSO Pass Pass
17 OQSO Pass Pass
18 DNA Pass Pass
Number of tests passed 15 18
Definition 2 For a given image, the most significant coeffi-
cients (in short MSCs), are coefficients that allow the descrip-
tion of the relevant part of the image, i.e. its most rich part (in
terms of embedding information), through a sequence of bits.
For example, in a spatial description of a grayscale image,
a definition of MSCs can be the sequence constituted by the
first three bits of each pixel as shown in Fig. 1(a). In a discrete
cosine frequency domain description, each 8 × 8 block of the
carrier image is mapped to a list of 64 coefficients. The energy
of the image is contained in the first of them. After binary
conversion, the first fourth coefficients of all these blocks can
constitute a possible sequence of MSCs.
Definition 3 By least significant coefficients (LSCs), we mean
a translation of some insignificant parts of a medium in a
sequence of bits (insignificant can be understand as: “which
can be altered without sensitive damages”).
These LSCs can be for example, the last three bits of the gray
level of each pixel, in the case of a spatial domain water-
marking of a grayscale image, as in Fig. 1(b). Discrete cosine,
(a) MSCs of Lena (b) LSCs of Lena
Fig. 1. Spatial MSCs and LSCs of Lena.
Fourier, and wavelet transform can be used to define LSCs
and MSCs, in the case of frequency domain watermarking,
among other possible choices. Moreover, these definitions are
not limited to image media, but can easily be extended to the
audio and video media as well.
LSCs are used during the embedding stage: some of the least
significant coefficients of the carrier image will be chaotically
chosen and replaced by the bits of the mixed watermark. With
a large number of LSCs, the watermark can be inserted more
than once and thus the embedding will be more secure and
robust, but also more detectable.
The MSCs are only useful in the case of authentication:
encryption and embedding stages depend on them. Hence, a
coefficient should not be defined at the same time, as a MSC
and a LSC; the last can be altered, while the first is needed to
extract the watermark.
B. Stages of the algorithm
Our watermarking scheme consists of two stages: (1) mix-
ture of the watermark and (2) its embedding.
1) Watermark mixture.: Firstly, for safety reasons, the wa-
termark can be mixed before its embedding into the image.
A common way to achieve this stage is to use the bitwise
exclusive or (XOR), for example, between the watermark and
the above PRNG. In this paper, we will use another mixture
scheme based on chaotic iterations. Its chaotic strategy, defined
with our PRNG, will be highly sensitive to the MSCs, in the
case of an authenticated watermark, as stated in [2].
2) Watermark embedding.: Some LSCs will be substituted
by all bits of the possibly mixed watermark. To choose the
sequence of LSCs to be altered, a number of integers, less
than or equal to the number N of LSCs corresponding to a
chaotic sequence
(
Uk
)
k
, is generated from the chaotic strategy
used in the mixture stage. Thus, the Uk-th least significant
coefficient of the carrier image is substituted by the kth bit of
the possibly mixed watermark. In the case of authentication,
such a procedure leads to a choice of the LSCs which are
highly dependent on the MSCs. For the detail of this stage see
Section VI-A2.
3) Extraction.: The chaotic strategy can be regenerated,
even in the case of an authenticated watermarking because the
MSCs have not been changed during the stage of embedding
the watermark. Thus, the few altered LSCs can be found,
the mixed watermark can then be rebuilt, and the original
watermark can be obtained. If the watermarked image is
attacked, then the MSCs will change. Consequently, in the
case of authentication and due to the high sensitivity of
the embedding sequence, the LSCs designed to receive the
watermark will be completely different. Hence, the result of the
recovery will have no similarity with the original watermark:
authentication is reached.
VI. EVALUATION OF ROBUSTNESS
In this section, a complete application example of the above
chaotic watermarking method is given and its robustness to
some attacks is studied. This case study enables us to precise
the details of the algorithm and evaluate it.
A. Stages and details
1) Images description.: Carrier image is Lena, a 256
grayscale image of size 256×256. The watermark is the 64×64
TABLE III
CROPPING ATTACKS
UNAUTHENTICATION AUTHENTICATION
Size (pixels) Similarity Size (pixels) Similarity
10 99.48% 10 49.68%
50 97.63% 50 54.54%
100 91.31% 100 52.24%
200 68.56% 200 51.87%
pixels binary image depicted in Fig. 2(a). The embedding
domain will be the spatial domain. The selected MSCs are
the four most significant bits of each pixel and the LSCs are
the three last bits (a given pixel will at most be modified of
four levels of gray by an iteration). Before its embedment,
the watermark is mixed with chaotic iterations. The system
to iterate, chaotic strategy S n and iterate function are defined
below.
(a)Watermark
(b)Watermarked Lena (c)Differences with original.
Fig. 2. Watermarked Lena and differences
2) Embedding of the watermark.: To embed the watermark,
the sequence (Uk)k∈N of altered bits taken from the M LSCs
must be defined. To do so, the strategy (S k)k∈N of the encryp-
tion stage is used as follows{
U0 = S 0
Un+1 = S n+1 + 2 × Un + n (mod M) (3)
to obtain the result depicted in Fig. 2(b). The map θ 7→ 2θ of
the torus, which is a famous example of topological Devaney’s
chaos [3], has been chosen to make (Uk)k∈N highly sensitive
to the chaotic strategy (S k)k∈N. As a consequence, (Uk)k∈N
is highly sensitive to the alteration of the MSCs. In case of
authentication, any significant modification of the watermarked
image will lead to a completely different extracted watermark.
B. Simulation results
To prove the efficiency and the robustness of the proposed
algorithm, some attacks are applied to our chaotically water-
marked image. For each attack, a similarity percentage with the
original watermark is computed. This percentage is the number
of equal bits between the original and the extracted watermark,
shown as a percentage. A result less than or equal to 50%
implies that the image has probably not been watermarked.
1) Cropping attack: In this kind of attack, a watermarked
image is cropped. In this case, the results in Table III have
been obtained.
TABLE IV
ROTATION ATTACKS
UNAUTHENTICATION AUTHENTICATION
Angle (degree) Similarity Angle (degree) Similarity
2 97.41% 2 70.01%
5 94.67% 5 59.47%
10 91.30% 10 54.51%
25 80.85% 25 50.21%
TABLE V
JPEG COMPRESSION ATTACKS
UNAUTHENTICATION AUTHENTICATION
Compression Similarity Compression Similarity
2 82.95% 2 54.39%
5 65.23% 5 53.46%
10 60.22% 10 50.14%
20 53.17% 20 48.80%
In Fig. 3, the decrypted watermarks are shown after a crop
of 50 pixels and after a crop of 10 pixels, in the authentication
case.
(a) Unauthentication (10 × 10).
(b) Authentication (10 × 10). (c) Unauthentication (50 × 50).
Fig. 3. Extracted watermark after a cropping attack.
By analyzing the similarity percentage between the original
and the extracted watermark, we can conclude that in the
case of unauthentication, the watermark still remains after
a cropping attack. The desired robustness is reached. It can
be noticed that cropping sizes and percentages are rather
proportional. In the case of authentication, even a small change
of the carrier image (a crop by 10 × 10 pixels) leads to a
really different extracted watermark. In this case, any attempt
to alter the carrier image will be signaled, thus the image is
well authenticated.
2) Rotation attack: Let rθ be the rotation of angle θ around
the center (128, 128) of the carrier image. So, the transforma-
tion r−θ ◦ rθ is applied to the watermarked image. The results
in Table IV have been obtained. The same conclusion as above
can be declaimed.
3) JPEG compression: A JPEG compression is applied to
the watermarked image, depending on a compression level.
This attack leads to a change of the representation domain
(from spatial to DCT domain). In this case, the results in
Table V have been obtained, illustrating a good authentication
through JPEG attack. As for the unauthentication case, the
watermark still remains after a compression level equal to 10.
This is a good result if we take into account the fact that we
TABLE VI
GAUSSIAN NOISE ATTACKS
UNAUTHENTICATION AUTHENTICATION
Standard dev. Similarity Standard dev. Similarity
1 74.26% 1 52.05%
2 63.33% 2 50.95%
3 57.44% 3 49.65%
use spatial embedding.
4) Gaussian noise: A watermarked image can be also
attacked by the addition of a Gaussian noise, depending on
a standard deviation. In this case, the results in Table VI are
obtained.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, the PRNG proposed in [15] is improved, by
using the famous XORshift generator. By combining these
components with chaotic iterations, we define a faster gen-
erator with chaotic properties. In addition to achieving the
NIST tests suite, this new generator successfully passes all
the stringent DieHARD battery of tests. The randomness and
disorder generated by this algorithm has been evaluated. It
offers a sufficient level of security for a whole range of
computer usages. An application example in the field of data
hiding is given and its robustness through attacks is studied.
In future work, the speed of our generator will be improved
again, the comparison of different chaotic strategies will be
explored, and other iteration functions will be studied. Finally,
new applications in computer science security field will be
proposed.
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